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Abstract—When authenticating a group of RFID tags, a common method is to authenticate each tag with some challenge-response
exchanges. However, sequentially authenticating individual tags one by one might not be desirable, especially when considering that a
reader often has to deal with multiple tags within a limited period, since it will incur long scanning time and heavy communication costs.
To address these problems, we put forward a novel efficient group authentication protocol where a group of tags can be authenticated
simultaneously with only one challenge and one response. The protocol is built on a new designed symmetric key based algorithm and
the bit-collision pattern technique, so that authentication responses transmitted by multiple tags in a group at the same time will result
in a verifiable bit-collision pattern that represents the authentication response for the entire group. The proposed approach can
significantly reduce the authentication time and communication cost in sense that the verifier can authenticate the entire group within a
period that is comparable to the time taken to perform a single tag authentication and requires only one challenge. In addition, we
extend our protocol to support privacy-preserving property which prevents the tagged items from being tracked by illegitimate parties. A
thorough security analysis shows that the proposed protocol can resist common practical attacks and experimental results show that
the protocol is very efficient in terms of time and communication costs. We also discuss important practical aspects that should be
considered when implementing these protocols.
Index Terms—Group authentication, RFID, bit-collision pattern, privacy-preserving.
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1 INTRODUCTION
RADIO Frequency IDentification (RFID) plays a criticalrole in the Internet of Things (IoT) such as tracking
applications in supply chain systems. Connecting RFID
readers and tags to the Internet allows objects attached with
tags to be effectively identified and tracked all over the
world. With the growing usage of RFID, however, security
and privacy issues surrounding this technology have also
attracted increasing attention. Even though some RFID de-
vices, such as contactless smart cards, implement a selection
of standard cryptographic functions (e.g. DES, AES, RSA),
these RFID tags used as electronic ‘labels’ in item tracking
services generally do not. This is mostly due to the fact
that item-level labeling requires a large volume of low-cost
RFID tags and that a small price increases per tag would
cause a large increase in operating expense as a result of
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implementing extra processing logic or memory required
for security mechanisms.
Nevertheless, as the RFID technology progresses, tags
could be probably indispensable to run security-related
functions for achieving secure tracking systems where at-
tackers should not be able to counterfeit items or remove
genuine items without being detected. Methods to imple-
ment additional security functionality while keeping tags
cost efficient (e.g., implementing ‘lightweight’, or minimal-
ist, security mechanisms for RFID systems) have been exten-
sively explored. The main idea is to employ authentication
protocols [1]–[4] to eliminate these attacks.
In conventional authentication mechanisms, a reader
sends a challenge to a tag which will then return a re-
sponse generated based on the challenge and a secret for
authentication purpose. However, it is not always feasible
to authenticate each tag individually especially in case that
a group of tags are required to be verified within a short
period. As an instance, a set of items embedded with RFID
tags could be quickly moving on a conveyor belt or placed
in a box on a truck that is rapidly passing through the
reader with limited scanning time. In this case, all the tags
are supposed to be authenticated by the reader as fast as
possible. Therefore, the interaction time between the reader
and each tag should also be considered upon designing se-
cure protocols for RFID systems. Namely, it is indispensable
to construct a highly efficient group authentication protocol
which allows the reader to authenticate multiple tags more
effectively.
Juels [5] introduced the concept of yoking-proof where
the system can verify the existence of two tags at the
same time. Later, an extension of yoking-proof is intro-
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duced: grouping proof, in which a group of tags (could
be more than two) can prove their existence to the system
simultaneously. There have been a number of grouping
proof protocols in the literature [6]–[16]. Nevertheless, the
majority of existing grouping proof protocols essentially
do not authenticate the group of tags simultaneously, but
actually authenticate them sequentially within a specified
time. In particular, the reader sends a request for a grouping
proof, and the first tag receiving the query will generate a
response that will be passed to the next tag which takes
the response as an input to calculate its own response. The
same process is repeated by the other tags until the last
one which will send the final response to the reader. These
responses constitute the so-called grouping proof. It is not
hard to figure out that this kind of grouping proof protocols
have marginal difference in terms of running time from pro-
tocols that authenticate tags one by one individually, since
the reader cannot verify the grouping proof until having
received all the tags’ separate responses. On the other hand,
a few protocols require the reader to broadcast a request
based on which all of the group of tags generate responses
(i.e. the grouping proof) at the same time. This method could
be scalable, but it is critical to deal with the collision issues if
all the tags send their responses simultaneously through the
same communication channel. Thus designing an efficient
anti-collision mechanism becomes the key factor. Due to the
collision avoidance, the group of tags cannot send all their
responses at the same time.
To further reduce the time cost in terms of authenticating
a group of tags, we proposed a new group authentication
protocol [17] which enables the reader to authenticate all the
tags in a group simultaneously. The time of authenticating
multiple tags is comparable to that of authenticating a
single tag. As an extension of this work, in this article we
improve the protocol with more comprehensive elaboration
of the design and thorough security analysis, and extend the
basic protocol to a privacy-preserving version. Moreover,
we also make performance comparison and evaluation of
the proposed protocols with both theoretical analysis and
real experiments. The main contributions are summarized
as follows:
• We propose a new lightweight group authentication
protocol that can verify a group of tags simultaneous-
ly with only one challenge and one response, that is,
the entire group of tags can be authenticated within a
period comparable to the time occurred to perform a
single tag authentication with minimum communica-
tion cost. In particular, the protocol is built on a new
designed symmetric key based algorithm and the
bit-collision pattern technique, so that authentication
responses transmitted by multiple tags in a group at
the same time will result in a verifiable bit-collision
pattern that represents the authentication response
for the entire group.
• We extend the basic protocol to support privacy-
preserving property which prevents the tagged item-
s from being tracked by illegitimate parties based
on a pseudonym technique. We further provide a
thorough security analysis of the proposed protocol,
demonstrating how the five prominent attacks can
be prevented. The analysis results show that a low
attack probability can be ensured as long as we
select proper parameters. In addition, both protocols
employ only a keyed pseudo-random function, per-
mutation operations and simple bit rotations, which
makes our protocols lightweight. To verify this, we
compare the proposed protocol with existing group
authentication protocols in terms of time cost, com-
munication cost, and security. The results show that
our protocol is much more efficient without sacrific-
ing security.
• We discuss important practical aspects that should be
considered when implementing the proposed proto-
col. We have conducted experiments with groups of
different sizes consisting of multiple tags transmit-
ting the same sequence simultaneously. The reader
we used allowed for a maximum group size of
11, after which the collision was no longer reliably
detected. A more powerful reader with a different
receiver architecture might allow for a larger group.
Therefore, our protocol is specially suitable for prac-
tical applications that require to authenticate a large
number of groups containing a limited number of
tags.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The
background and related work on group authentication for
RFID tags are introduced in Section 2, where we classify
group authentication into three different modes in terms of
the interaction time. The research problems are formulated
in Section 3. In Section 4, the basic group authentication
protocol using bit-collision patterns is presented in Section
4. Then Section 4.2 elaborates how to extend the basic pro-
tocol to a privacy-preserving one. The comparison of some
selected existing group authentication protocols with our
proposed protocol is shown in Section 5. Finally the practical
considerations when implementing the proposed protocol
are discussed in Section 6 and this paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The concept of cryptographically authenticating a group
of items has been introduced for more than a decade. In
2004, Juels [5] took the first step with coining a similar
definition (i.e., the yoking-proof) where a reader can verify
the existence of two tags at almost the same time. Their
protocol is shown in Figure 1 and briefly described as the
following:
1) Two tags tA and tB share secret keys kA and kB
with the verifier V , which in this case is not the
reader but the backend system.
2) The reader R Query tA which randomly selects a
nonce rA and sends rA, A to R, where A is tA’s
identity.
3) R forwards rA and queries tag tB , which calculates
mB = MACkB [rA] using its secret key kB and
tag tA’s random nonce. Similarly, tB also selects a
random nonce rB and sends rB , mB as well as its
identity B to R.
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Reader RTag tA Tag tB
Query
a = (A, rA)
rB
mA
mA = MACkA [rB ]
Query, rA
B,mB , rB
mB = MACkB [rA]
R to V : PAB = (A,B,mA,mB)
Fig. 1. Yoking Proof for RFID Tags
4) R forwards rB to tA, which calculates mA =
MACkA [rB ] using its secret key kA and the rB value
it just received. mA is then sent to R.
5) R sends the proof, PAB = (A,B,mA,mB) and
rA, rB to the backend system V .
The verifier V can generate P ′AB using its version of the
tag keys and the nonces contained in the proof received from
the reader. It can then check that P ′AB = PAB to verify that
tA and tB were presented simultaneously. Despite the ver-
ifier never communicating with the tags directly it has also
verified that the two tags the reader communicated with
are the genuine tA and tB , as both used the correct secret
shared keys kA and kB . The proof therefore also serves as
a basic method for group authentication. As an extension,
the notion of grouping-proof which allows authentication
of a group of tags (could be more than two) is introduced
and explored by [6]. Liu et al. [11] proposed a grouping-
proof based authentication protocol for distributed RFID
systems in 2013. After that until recently, a lot of researchers
have proposed new grouping proof protocols with efforts
on providing security or privacy for RFID systems [7]–[10],
[12]–[16], [18]–[22]. For instance, Shen et al. [20] proposed an
efficient grouping-proof protocol that requires less message
interaction and computation overhead on the tags. Howev-
er, it is analyzed by Dhailah et al. [22] that their protocol was
vulnerable to a full-disclosure attack.
Although existing grouping proofs support the veri-
fication of completeness and soundness of a group, the
factor of transaction time has been seldom considered. Some
protocols claim that they can authenticate a group of tags
“simultaneously”. However, essentially, the reader authen-
ticates the group of tags sequentially within a specified
time bound in their protocols. To make it more clear, we
draw a figure to show different types of protocols that
aim to provide group authentication in Figure 2. Existing
grouping proof protocols belong to a variety of the first type,
where each tag sends an individual response sequentially.
In a grouping proof protocol, the verifier sends the first
challenge to a tag which outputs its response. Next tag’s
challenge is the last tag’s response, just like a chain. In
total, with n tags, there are n challenges and n responses
transmitted at different time in the grouping proof protocol.
Recently, Chen et al. [12] presented a provable secure batch
authentication scheme for EPCGen2 RFID tags. The reader
sends only one challenge and obtains multiple responses
from different tags and then makes aggregative computa-





0 x x 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
Fig. 3. Constructing bit-collision patterns with Manchester code
for batch authentication. However, they do not mention
how the group tags’ responses are collected simultaneously
without collisions.
To allow for any potential timing restrictions it would be
ideal if a group of tags are able to truly be authenticated
simultaneously utilizing only a single challenge-response
sequence, namely, type 3 in Figure 2(c). This would require
that all tags send their corresponding responses simultane-
ously. Fortunately, some RFID technologies already allow
for this scenario. For instance, in systems adhering to the
ISO 14443 [23] and ISO 15693 [24] (ISO 18000-3 [24]) s-
tandards multiple tags simultaneously transmit information
to the reader during the anti-collision process. The tokens’
responses are Manchester coded and they are synchronized
to start transmitting in the same bit period, which as a
consequence can create clearly defined bit collisions during
certain bit periods, as shown in Figure 3. This figure shows
the Manchester-encoded data, which is first modulated onto
a sub-carrier, load modulated onto the HF carrier with 8-
12 % modulation depth. The reader therefore observes a
bit pattern containing both collisions and non-collision val-
ues. Although not all RFID tags use Manchester encoding,
there could be some way to build bit-collision patterns for
tags using other encoding methods. Taking EPC Class-1
Generation-2 (ISO 18000-6C) [25] tags as an example, the
data are encoded as the following: a signal that keeps high
or low for the entire bit duration represents ‘1’ while a
signal changed from high to low or from low to high at
the half of the bit period represents ‘0’. The two ‘0’ symbols
are therefore identical to the symbols used in Manchester
coding and could thus be utilized to build a bit-collision
pattern similarly.
Bit-collisions have been applied to privacy-preserving
security mechanisms by intentionally blocking tag respons-
es to unauthorized readers [26] and to key exchange pro-
tocols [27], [28], but have not been employed to design
authentication protocols. The intuitive idea of exploiting
bit-collisions is based on the assumption that no attacker
can distinguish the individual bits sent from multiple tags
if a collision happens. Hancke [29] showed that in the
case of two tags sending messages at the same time and
resulting in a bit-collision pattern, an attacker has some
chance to infer the individual responses due to variations
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Fig. 2. Three Types of Protocols that Aim to Provide Group Authentication.
attacker’s success probability will decrease if the number of
tags increases.
One similar research topic is to achieve fast identification
of large-scale RFID tags based on anti-collision mechanisms
including Aloha-based [30] and Tree-based [31] protocols. The
combination of Aloha-based and Tree-based protocol is also
considered [32]. However, these designs are essentially the
same as per-tag identification (type 1), i.e., identifying tags
sequentially, with the advantage of making full use of the
communication channel. Yang et al. [33] proposed a prob-
abilistic batch authentication protocol which means that a
group of tags are authentic with probability greater than
1 − δ if the number of fake tags is less than n ∗ ϵ, where
δ and ϵ are two security parameters. Based on this work,
they proposed an extended batch authentication scheme
that further addressed the scalability issue recently [34]. In
contrast, our protocol is deterministic which guarantees a
batch is authentic with probability of 1.
With regards to the privacy issues, there have been a
lot of related works in the literature [18], [35]–[46] that can
be adapted to RFID systems. Generally, pseudonym-based
approach like [43] provides untraceability of the prover
and employs computationally efficient algorithms such as
symmetric encryption algorithms and hash functions. On
contrast, public-key cryptography based approach can pro-
vide more desirable functions such as key exchange [18]
except for mere untraceability, but these schemes require
much heavier computation on the prover side and thus
might not be enjoyable for RFID systems.
3 SYSTEM MODEL, THREAT MODEL, AND DESIGN
GOALS
We formulate the problem by describing the system and
threat models and identifying the design goals of group
authentication for RFID systems.
3.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 4, the system contains a group of tags,
a reader and a verifier. Each of the entities is defined as
follows:
Group Tags. A number of tags embedded in related
objects (one tag per object) are divided into a group. Note
that the group of tags are physically packed together and
thus they will be interrogated together by the same reader.
Fig. 4. The system model
Each tag stores some secret information shared with the
verifier that will be used for the authentication.
Reader. An RFID reader is a device that gathers infor-
mation from RFID tags. It starts a protocol session with a
querying message and relays the information transmitted
between the verifier and the tags, which helps the verifier
authenticate the tags. The reader itself does not need to
share secret keys with the tags or the verifier.
Verifier. The verifier could be a PC or a server connected
with a database and stores the necessary information used
to authenticate the group tags. The verifier does not have
to be online all the time, but be notified to start a protocol
by a reader as long as the reader queries a group of tags.
Whenever the tags are transported to a checking place, a
reader will connect with the verifier and start the protocol.
A group authentication protocol is comprised of three
phases: initialization phase, challenge-response phase and
verification phase. The tags and the verifier prepare to start
a protocol session after receiving a start command from
the reader in the initialization phase. The verifier sends out
challenges to the tags and receives corresponding responses
back in the challenge-response phase. Finally, the verifier
verifies the responses to make a decision in the verification
phase. Unlike a common authentication protocol, in the
group authentication protocol, the verifier authenticates a
group of tags in batch, rather than authenticating each tag of
the group one by one in sequence. The group authentication
protocol is said to be complete if valid group tags are always
accepted by the verifier, and to be sound if only valid group
tags are accepted, that is, no attacker can impersonate a tag
without being detected.
3.2 Threat Model
We consider a probabilistic polynomial time adversary
which can eavesdrop, intercept and modify messages trans-
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mitted in the protocol run. The adversary could also observe
the result of a session, that is, whether the verifier and the
group tags accept each other.
We also consider a more powerful attacker which has
two more capabilities. First, the strong attacker can observe
the individual output of each tag. This is truly a powerful
capability for the attacker since it is unlikely during normal
system operations. In practice, the adversary can only eaves-
drop the composite outputs from the group tags, rather than
individual tag outputs. Nevertheless, we’d like to explore
whether our protocol is still secure against so powerful
attacks. The second capability is that when transmitting
the authentication proof/state, the strong attacker can de-
termine the bit value and prepare its response right at the
start of the bit period, even though this might be unrealistic
in practice as RF receivers usually integrate or sample over
the entire bit period. In particular, the authentication state
consists of multiple bit pairs. For each bit pair, the attacker
could observe the first composite bit from the other tags
and then decide what to do for the second bit. The benefits
of this for the attacker will be discussed later in the security
analysis in Section 4.3.
3.3 Design Goals
Based on the system model and security threats above, we
define the design goals for a group authentication protocol
in terms of three aspects: security, efficiency and privacy,
elaborated as follows.
• Security: The group authentication protocol should
allow the verifier to authenticate a group of tags
simultaneously and detect whether any tag in the
group has been replaced or simply lost with an over-
whelming probability. More precisely, the protocol
should be able to prevent the five prominent attacks
that will be discussed in Section 4.3.
• Efficiency: The design should be computationally ef-
ficient especially on the tag side.
• Privacy: A privacy-preserving protocol should ensure
that no attacker can trace the group of tags according
to their transaction histories.
4 GROUP AUTHENTICATION BASED ON BIT-
COLLISION PATTERNS
A usual construction of authentication protocols is built on
a challenge-response interaction between the prover and the
verifier. The proposed protocol works on the principle that
a group of tags transmitting their individual authentication
responses simultaneously will result in a verifiable bit colli-
sion pattern that represents the authentication response for
the entire group. Before presenting the protocol design, we
first introduce the bit collision operation with more details.
Let β, β′ ∈ {0, 1} be two bit symbols. The collision operation
between β and β′ is denoted as β ! β′ and x is denoted as
a bit collision. The values of β !β′ with different inputs are
as the following:





In particular, as long as there are two tags sending different
bit values in the same bit slot, the composite value will be a
bit collision x regardless of the values sent by other tags in
the group, i.e. 1 ! x = x and 0 ! x = x.
In the presented protocol, each tag ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) owns
an authentication state si, where n is the number of tags in
the group. If these tags send their individual authentication
states at the same time, the reader will receive a composite
group authentication state S, i.e. S = s1 ! s2 ! . . . ! sn,
which can be utilized for authentication of the group tags.
If each tag contributes equal number of bit collisions (at
least one), the completeness of the group can be verified
easily by checking the total number of bit collisions. If the
number of bit collisions is less than expected values, the
verifier knows that at least one tag is missing or some fake
tags with incorrect authentication states have been placed
in the group. In the case of a complete group but some
collisions are in wrong bit positions, the verifier knows
that the group is not sound. More precisely, the verifier
can precompute and know which tag should contribute bit
collisions to which positions. If some bit collision occurs
in an unexpected position, the verifier can conclude that
this is a fake tag. For instance, suppose a group containing
four tags and each tag contributes one collision to an 8-bits
group authentication state, then the group authentication
procedure runs as the following:
tags correct missing s4 fake s4
s1 01000011 01000011 01000011
s2 01001001 01001001 01001001
s3 01100001 01100001 01100001
s4 11000001 missing 01010001
S x1x0x0x1 01x0x0x1 01xxx0x1
In the case that the group is sound and complete, namely,
all the tags in the group transmit correct authentication
states as depicted in the second column, the verifier will
observe four bit collisions in the positions of (1, 3, 5, 7).
Otherwise, in the case that the group is incomplete, i.e.,
there is some tag missing such as s4, the verifier will only
observe three bit collisions and thus can detect a missing tag
event, as depicted in the third column. In the case that the
group is not sound, i.e., there is some tag (e.g., s4) replaced
by a counterfeit one, the verifier will observe wrong bit-
collision patterns rather than expected, as depicted in the
fourth column.
Based on the bit-collision patterns, we propose two
group authentication protocols, where the basic one allows
a verifier to check the the completeness and soundness of
a group of tags, hence protecting the tags in the group
from being stolen or replaced by attackers during ship-
ment, and the extended one also considers the privacy of
the group/tags. To keep the privacy, we mean that the
group/tags cannot be traced. The basic protocol is much
more efficient but violating the group privacy, while the ex-
tended protocol requires more computation but preserving
the privacy. In practice, it depends on the purpose or the
usability to decide which protocol to be deployed.
4.1 The Basic Protocol
The basic proposal is depicted in Figure 5. We consider a
group with n tags. Each tag shares a keyed pseudo-random
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Tag Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Reader R Verifier V
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= f1(r, seq + 1, kg)








Snew−−−−−−−→ if S ′new == Snew
seq = seq + 1 accept Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Fig. 5. The proposed basic group-authentication protocol
function f1, a state permutation function f2, the group
identifier IDg and the group key kg with the verifier. In
addition, each tag ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is initialized with a unique
authentication state sicurrent and a common counter seq.
1) The reader R broadcasts a query information such
as a Start command to start the protocol.
2) Upon receiving the query, all the tags return IDg ,
seq and n simultaneously. Due to the fact that
these tags are sending the same information at the
same time, there should be no bit collisions at the
reader side. R relays the received composite infor-
mation to the verifier V . In case of the existence
of bit collisions, V can decide what kind of errors
is happening. In particular, if the collisions occur
only in seq, V judges that some tags must have
been desynchronized. If the collisions occur in seq
and IDg , V judges that that illegitimate tags have
responded.
3) V selects a random string r and computes m1 =
f1(r, seq, kg). It then transmits the bit string r and
m1 to R which relays the information to the tags.
4) All the tags in group IDg compute m′1 =
f1(r, seq, kg) and check whether m′1 is equivalent
to m1, which achieves the authentication of V . If V
is authentic, all the tags send out their individual
current authentication state sicurrent , which allows V
to learn the current composite group authentication
state Scurrent.
5) Each tag ti updates its current authentication state
with f2 by calculating sinew = f2(sicurrent ,m2),
where m2 = f1(r, seq + 1, kg). Subsequently, all the
tags send out their new states sinew(1 ≤ i ≤ n)
which will form into a new composite group state
Snew. Then, R relays Snew to V .









7) All the tags update the value of seq and sicurrent .
If Snew ̸= S′new, the verifier detects an exception which
helps people to make further investigation on the group of
objects. With the advantage of the proposed protocol that
any subset of the group can be simultaneously authenticated
by the verifier with running the same protocol, the tags
causing the exception can be identified very efficiently. For
instance, the verifier can authenticate a single tag ti by
only running the protocol with ti and comparing whether
sinew = f2(sicurrent). In this special case, both sinew and
f2(sicurrent) are traditional bit strings without collisions.
Similarly, the verifier can simultaneously verify a subgroup
of ℓ tags each of which contributes c collisions. In this case,
the verifier utilizes f2(Sℓcurrent) to check whether S
ℓ
new in-
cludes ℓc collisions in the correct bit positions along with an
additional (2n− ℓ)c correct non-collision values. Therefore,
the verifier can execute the protocol with individual tags or
split the group into smaller subgroups, in order to identify
missing or counterfeit tags.
4.1.1 Construction of S and f2
Since the group initialization and the authentication state
update are critical to the proposed protocol, we now elab-
orate how to initialize and update the authentication state
(i.e., how to construct the state permutation function f2).
Initialization of authentication state: Before the items
(embedded with tags) are shipped, the sender needs to
initialize the authentication state for each individual tag in
a group so that they can be authenticated by the verifier
during shipment. In order to verify the completeness and
soundness of a group, each of tags in the group should
contribute at least one bit collision to the composite group
authentication state. Otherwise, if there are some tags which
do not cause any bit collision, the attacker can just simply
remove them from the group without affecting the authen-
tication results. Furthermore, the number of bit collisions
contributed by each of the tags should be identical, which
would enable the verifier to calculate the number of missing
tags in case that the group is not complete. For example,
considering a group that contains two tags, A and B each
of which contributes one collision, and another two tags,
C and D each of which contributes two collisions. In case
of lacking two collisions in the group authentication state,
the verifier cannot determine whether two tags (A + B) or
one tag (either C or D) are missing. Finally, in our design,
each bit collision is paired with a non-collision bit such that
the bit swap operation in f2 (described in the following
section) will always occur a change on the position of a bit
collision. As a consequence, suppose each tag contributes
c bit collisions, each of which is associated with a non-
collision bit, then the bit length of the group authentication
state S and the individual tags’ states si should be 2cn,
where n is the number of tags in the group. In the following,
we illustrate how the authentication state is initialized (by
the sender).
1) Determine the value of c, i.e., the number of bit
collisions which each tag shall contribute. If both c
and n are even numbers then 2cn will always being
a multiple of eight, which is a useful property if the
communication channel is byte oriented. If this is
a desired property and a shipment consists of an
uneven number of items the sender could add a
single ‘padding’ tag to make n even.
2) Generate a state matrix M with n rows and 2cn
columns and initialize M with all zeros. Each row
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represents a tag’s authentication state comprised of
cn bit pairs.
3) Choose random c bit pairs, b1, . . . , bc, from the set
of cn pairs (i.e., bi ∈ [1, cn]). In the first row set
the first bit value of each chosen pair equal to 1, i.e.
M1,2bi−1 = 1 for i = 1, . . . , c. Remove the previ-
ously chosen b1, . . . , bc from the set, select another c
pairs from the remaining c(n − 1) pairs and set the
corresponding bit values in row 2 to 1 in a similar
way as before. Repeat until all n rows contain c
collisions. For instance, in the case of n = 4 and
c = 2, the authentication states are initialized as the
following:
Tag states Choosing bit pairs
s1 1000000000001000 1, 7 of (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
s2 0010100000000000 2, 3 of (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8)
s3 0000001000100000 4, 6 of (4, 5, 6, 8)
s4 0000000010000010 5, 8 of (5, 8)
S x0x0x0x0x0x0x0x0
4) Load each tag with the group ID IDg , group key kg
and set the sequence counter seq.
5) Finally, the sender executes the group
authentication protocol with the group of tags
to randomize the values of the non-collision
bits and the positions of the bit collisions before
shipment.
State permutation function f2: f2 should satisfy the
property: f2(s1) ! f2(s2) ! . . . ! f2(sn) = f2(S). We
create a permutation function with bit operations such as
XOR, shift and bit swap. A shift operation rotates the entire
authentication state clockwise in unit of a pair (i.e., bits wrap
around). A bit swap exchanges the two bit values in a pair.
Note that neither the shift nor the bit swap operations will
occur a change on the number of bit collisions or shuffle
the relationship between tags and their contribution bits
(i.e., which tag contributes to which specific bit collision).
However, they will effect the positions of these bit collisions.
An XOR operation XORs the authentication state with a
pseudorandom string and thus will not change the number
or positions of the bit collisions, but it may effect the bit
values that contribute to the collision, i.e. if a, b, c are binary
bits, then if a ̸= b, (a⊕c)!(b⊕c) = x. This property always
holds because if a ̸= b then (a⊕ c) ̸= (b⊕ c), which results
in (a⊕ c) ! (b⊕ c) = x.
In the proposed group authentication protocol, one of
the inputs for f2 is the output of a keyed pseudo-random
function f1. Considering the case of a group with n tags
each of which contributes c collisions (resulting in cn bit
pairs), the authentication state is able to be shifted by x
places where x ∈ [1, cn−1]. To define f2, the input of f2 can
thus be parsed into three bit strings, i.e., XOR string (2cn
bits), bit swap string (cn bits) and shift string ⌈log2(cn)⌉
bits). As a consequence, the input of f2 (i.e., the output of
f1) should be a bit string with the length of 3cn+⌈log2(cn)⌉.
If a single output of f1 is too short, we can recursively
generate a longer pseudo-random string by concatenating
the previous output with a new one created with the same
function taking the previous output as the input.
We elaborate the work principle of f2 by giving the
following example, where there are four tags in the group
and each tag contributes to one bit collision. The initial













Thus, we need to swap bit pairs 2 and 4, rotate right by one
bit pair and XOR the result with 10100101.
Swap Shift XOR
s1 01000011 11010000 01110101
s2 01001010 10010010 00110111
s3 01010010 10010100 00110001
s4 11000010 10110000 00010101
Sold x10xx01x 1xx10xx0 0xx10xx1
Obviously, we can judge that Snew = f2(Sold) =
f2(s1) ! f2(s2) ! f2(s3) ! f2(s4)=0xx10xx1.
4.2 The Extended Protocol
The basic protocol guarantees the security but not privacy
of the group/tags. Indeed, an attacker can record the group
identity IDg and thus trace the group easily. We now
extend the basic protocol to provide the group privacy. We
essentially employ a pseudo anonymous index of a group
and update it once after a successful session.
The extended protocol is shown in Figure 6. To keep the
privacy of the group, each tag stores an index I of the group
identity IDg . The index I is initialized to be the hash output
of IDg and kg , i.e. h(IDg, kg). The verifier stores two indices
for each group, i.e., TID and TID′, which are initialized to
be h(IDg, kg) as well. The purpose of using two indices in
the verifier side is to prevent the desynchronization attack.
TID stores the old value of the index while TID′ stores the
current value.
1) Like the basic protocol, the extended protocol starts
by the reader transmitting a Start command.
2) All the tags simultaneously respond with I , seq
and n. The reader relays the received composite
information to the verifier.
3) The verifier searches for the corresponding group
from the database according to the index I . Note
that since the verifier stores indices in the database,
it is very easy to match the group with O(1)
computation. If I cannot be found neither in the
TID column nor in the TID′ column, the ver-
ifier rejects and stops the protocol. Otherwise, if
I == TID′, then the verifier updates TID and
TID′ to synchronize with the group tags. Mean-
while, the verifier creates a random string r and
computes m1 = f1(r, seq, kg). It then transmits the
bit string r and m1 to the reader which relays the
information to the tags.
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−−−−−−−→ if I 6= TID and I 6= TID′
reject and stop
else if I == TID′
TID = TID′, TID′ = h(kg, T ID
′)
r ←R {0, 1}k
m′
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I = h(kg, I)




= f1(r, seq + 1, kg)






Snew−−−−−−−→ if S ′new == Snew
sicurrent = f2(sinew ,m2) accept Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Fig. 6. The proposed extended group-authentication protocol with privacy
4) The same as the basic protocol.
5) All the tags update the index I and the sequence
number seq with the same way, and generate their
new individual authentication state sinew . Those
individual authentication state are transmitted to
the reader simultaneously, which will raise a new
composite group authentication state Snew.
6) The same as the basic protocol.
7) All the tags update the value of sicurrent to be
f2(sinew ,m2).
4.3 Security Analysis
With the proposed protocol, the attacker’s behavior of only
stealing tags from a group can be easily detected since that
will cause the change of the composite group authentication
state. Therefore, the attacker need to replace rather than
only steal tags in a group. To avoid being detected by the
verifier, the attacker has to send a proper response at the
same time when other tags transmit theirs, and has to make
sure the composite group response is correct. According to
the attacker’s capabilities, we investigate five attack cases.
In each case the success probability pa of the attack will be
analyzed in details as follows.
4.3.1 Case 1: Attacker Using a Simple Tag
In this case, the replacement tag set by the attacker performs
as a normal tag. Although the attacker can obtain the com-
posite state Scurrent, this does not help it much to compute
Snew since it still needs to guess the positions and values
of the bit collisions that the replacement tag contributes
to, as well as the values of the updated non-collision bits.
Otherwise, either incorrect contribution to bit collisions or
incorrect non-collision values transmitted by the attacker’s
replacement tag will incur extra collisions. In order to pass
the authentication, the attacker has to guess the correct bit
values in all positions where the rest of tags do not cause
bit collisions. Considering the case of a group with 4 tags
and each tag contributes 2 collisions, thus the authentication
state is 16-bits and is supposed to contain 8 collision bits.
Since the authentication state is indistinguishable from a
random string, the probability that the attacker guesses the
correct authentication state of the replaced tag is 1216 . Never-
theless, for the collisions caused by other tags, the attacker
does not need to transmit correct bits since whatever it
transmits on those positions has no affects on the result
(collision caused by other tags). Therefore, the attacker only
needs to guess correctly the 2 bits that actually contribute
bit collisions and the 8 bits that are non-collisions need to be
correct. For the remaining 6 bits, the attacker would always
be successful no mater what it transmits, which means that
of the 216 possible bit permutations 26 would contribute
to the right result. As a consequence, the attacker’s success
probability of guessing a tag authentication state s′i which
will result in the correct group authentication state Snew
becomes 1210 . In general, if the attack replaces na ≤ n−2 tags
from a group of n tags, and each tag contributes c collisions,















since the single legitimate tag left cannot contribute any
collisions by itself and therefore the attacker would need
to guess all the bit values correctly.
4.3.2 Case 2: Attacker Using a Quiet Tag
In this case, the replacement tag set by the attacker does
not have to perform adhering to the protocol. Namely, the
attacker guesses the bit positions where the replacement
tag is supposed to occur bit collisions and then only sends
the guessed bit values in those positions. For the other
positions, the replacement tag stays quiet. Note that in this
scenario, the attacker has no clue of what the remaining
tags are transmitting. With this strategy, the attacker does
not bother to transmit correct non-collision bit values which
helps the attacker avoiding occurring extra bit collisions. In
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order to pass the authentication, the attacker should guess
the correct bit positions as well as the correct bit values
which will cause collisions. Consider the same example as
in Case 1 (n = 4, c = 2), and assume that the group
was initialized as described in Section 4.1.1. The attacker
first guesses which bit pairs contain a collision caused by












binomial function 8!(8−2)!(2)! =
8·7
2·1 . In addition, the attacker
also has to guess the correct position and bit value which
occurs a collision within each chosen pair, the probability of
















. In general, if the
attack replaces na ≤ n− 2 tags from a group of n tags, and













If the attacker replaces na = n− 1 tags, then it has to make
one collision in every bit pair because the single remaining
legitimate tag is not able to cause any bit collision on its
own. Therefore, the success probability of the attacker in
this case is identical to that in Equation 2.
4.3.3 Case 3: Attacker Using a Smart Tag
In this case, the replacement tag set by the attacker does not
have to perform adhering to the protocol, either. Moreover,
the attacker can see what bit values are transmitted by the
other tags. The attacker is also assumed to have the ability
to determine the bit value and prepare its response right
at the start of the bit period, even though it may not be
practical since typical RF receivers integrate or sample over
the entire bit period. With this capability, the attacker can
first observe what bit values transmitted by the other tags
and then just transmits the alternative value in order to
make a bit collision in that position. In addition, if the
attacker observes a bit collision, then it does not need to
send anything out, which obviously help it guess the bit
positions where it should occur collisions. Similar with Case
2, the attacker does not need to guess the non-collision bit
values since it could either keep quiet or simply observe
correct values from the other tags.
Consider the same example as in Case 1 (n = 4, c = 2),
and assume that the group was initialized as described in
Section 4.1.1. The attacker observes the first position of each
bit pairs. As long as the first bit has been made a collision
by the other tags, it can keep quiet or just send the same
bit value as what the other tags transmit without occurring
extra collisions. If f1 is a secure pseudorandom function,
then half of the 6 collisions contributed by the other tags
would be in the first bit position of the pair on average.
Thus, the attacker only needs to select c (2) bit pairs to which
it will contribute collisions from 8-3=5 bit pairs instead of 8,











. Nevertheless, it still has to determine
whether to pose a bit collision in the first or second position
within the rest of pairs, with a probability of 12 to guess
the correct value and position that occurs a collision in each










. In general, if the attack replaces na ≤ n− 2 tags
from a group of n tags, and each tag contributes c collisions,












In case that cn + cna is an odd number, we can round
down it to give the attacker more chances to succeed. If the
attacker replaces na = n − 1 tags, then it has to make one
collision in every bit pair, but it can still see the response of
the remaining legitimate tag which can help it choose correct
bit values in collision positions (i.e., simply transmitting








4.3.4 Case 4: Attacker Knowing Tag States
In this case we allow the attacker to observe individual
authentication state transmitted by the tags. Namely, it
can observe the current authentication state si of each tag
upon transmitted, which may help it determine the collision
positions that shall be caused by the tag it replaces through
comparing its state with the other tags’ states. If the other
tags transmit the same bit value while the replaced tag
transmits a distinct value, the attacker can determine that
this collision position is contributed by the replaced tag.
Actually, it is the worst case since this is unlikely to happen
during normal operation of the system. In practice, the
attacker can only observe the composite authentication state
S which as a whole does not leak much information about
individual tag authentication states.
With this capability, in the scenario of Case 1, i.e., using
a simple tag adhering to the protocol, the attacker earns
no benefits from the knowledge of the current individual
authenticate state, since it still has no clue of how to gen-
erate the new individual authentication state that it has to
transmit in order to pass the authentication. Therefore, its
success probability is the same as Equation 1. However,in
case 2 and 3, the attacker’s success probability increases.
The attacker only needs to guess how to rotate and swap the
authentication state, and the positions where the collisions
should be caused in the new group authentication state.
Consider that the attacker replaces na ≤ n − 2 tags from
a group of n tags, and each tag contributes c collisions. As











As to an attacker using a quiet tag, it also needs to guess











In case that the attacker removes na = n − 1 tags, the
success probability is the same as previously described for
this scenario in Case 2 and Case 3.
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4.3.5 Case 5: Attacker Creating a New Group
In this case, the attacker tries to forge a whole group, i.e.,
replacing all the tags in the group. Intuitively, this is the
most difficult attack since the attacker must guess all the
correct collision positions as well as the values of non-
collision positions. As a result, considering a group of n tags,








Note that the above five attack cases have covered the
most effective attack strategies that aim to replace or imper-
sonate tags. We have considered adversaries with increasing
capabilities, for example, from the passive attacker who only
impersonates a simple tag without any useful additional
information (the case 1 and case 5) to the most strong
attacker who can even observe individual authentication
state transmitted by the tags (the case 4). Thus, in defining
these 5 cases, we already go further than related works
(probabilistic tag detection/verification schemes). Usually
only Case 1 is covered and there are now some works that
start to consider Case 2 (whether a fake tag might have more
chance to hide if elects to stay quiet sometimes).
4.3.6 Privacy
The extended protocol provides the group privacy. Indeed,
the index I will be updated after each successful session
and the attacker cannot trace the group by the index. In
the basic protocol, the attacker could trace the group by
another way, that is, it can record Snew of the current





current is the composite state
transmitted by the group tags in next session. However, in
the extended protocol, this attack does not work, since each
tag updates sicurrent after a successful session, which means
in next session the first state will not be the same as the last
state transmitted in the current session. Thus, if f1 and f2
are secure, then the privacy is preserved. The security of f2
depends on m2 which is an output of the function f1. That
is, if f1 is secure then f2 is secure, so is the protocol.
5 EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF EXISTING
RFID GROUP AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
We first evaluate the security of the proposed schemes. As
shown in Figure 7, the attacker’s success probability to re-
place/impersonate tags is throughly evaluated. Figures 7(a),
7(b) and 7(c) show the relationship between the attacker’s
success probability and the size of the group n, the number
of collisions that each tag contributes, and the number of
tags replaced by the attacker, respectively, among which we
evaluate the success probability in Case 4 using Equation 6
because it represents the attacker’s best strategy. From these
figures, we observe that either the more collisions each tag
contributes or the more tags to be replaced, the more diffi-
cult for the attacker to succeed, which is in consistent with
our intuitive thought. The attackers success rate, especially
for the advanced attack in case 4, could be 1105 for some
selected parameters. However, it does not mean the attack
would be practical to our protocol. In particular, the attacker
succeeds only if the attacker has the opportunity to try more
than one option till he finds a guess that works. Fortunately,
the proposed protocol does not allow him that luxury. The
attacker has only one chance to guess a tag’s state in each
protocol run. The next protocol run uses a different seq and
r so it is not simply a case of trying the next guess (as by
now the state could be totally different). It is similar to a PIN
- in theory an attacker has a 1104 chance of guessing a 4-digit
numeric pin as the total combinations are 10× 10× 10× 10.
However, as the number of attempts is limited to 3, it cannot
be practically guessed with brute force. In our scheme if
the attacker knows a tags state he could try and guess the
next state - if he gets it wrong the protocol fails. He cannot
then rerun the protocol under the same conditions (same seq
and r), with all the other tags still containing the previous
state. Therefore, our protocol is good to prevent all these
five attacks in practice.
Then, we compare our proposed scheme with existing
authentication protocols which aim to achieve batch authen-
tication from several aspects: time cost of authenticating the
whole group of tags, the whole communication cost and
privacy protection for the tags. The time cost is computed
as the number of rounds required to authenticate the group
of tags multiplied by the time cost of each round where
we follow the definition of a round as the exchange of a
verifier message and relative tag response from [32]. The
communication cost is denoted by the number of exchanged
messages including the information sent from both the
verifier and the group of tags.
As shown in Table 1, we choose existing typical different
types of protocols to compare. A grouping proof protocol
is essentially like a per-tag authentication, with each tag
waiting for last tag’s output to generate its own proof. Both
the time and the communication cost are the same as per-tag
authentication, i.e., n× (tc+ tr) and n× (c+ r) respectively.
In tree-based protocols, in each round, the verifier sends a
query and receiving multiple tags’ responses at the same
time and thus the time cost of each round is tc + tr . While it
has been proved that the tree-based protocol requires at least
2.66n rounds to authenticate n tags, the total cost of time is
thus 2.66n×(tc+ tr). Aloha-based protocol needs tc+s× tr
time in each round, where s is the number of slots in a frame.
Compared with tree-based protocol, aloha-based protocol
needs less rounds but each round needs more time. BSTSA
is the combination of tree-based and aloha-based protocol,
with the strengths of both. It does not need to know the
number of tags n a priori to achieve maximum efficiency,
but this is not a concern in our paper, since we assume that
we already know the number of tags in advance. Chen et
al.’s protocol considers a reader sends a query to the group
tags and collects all the responses from the tag to generate
an aggregated response. However, they do not mention
how the group tags’ responses are collected simultaneously
without collisions. Their protocol can adopt either tree-
based or aloha-based technique to reduce the collisions.
Therefore, the time cost of their protocol is O(n)× (tc + tr).
Finally, in our protocol, the reader sends a query and all
the tags send individual responses at the same time. These
individual responses will turn into a combined response,
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(a) Replace a single tag (na = 1) in the case
of a constant length of the authentication state
2cn = 96.

















(b) Replace a single tag (na = 1) in the case of
n = 8 with different number of collisions that
each tag contributes.

















(c) Replace multiple tags from a group with 16
tags and each tag contributes 2 bit collisions
(n = 16, c = 2).
Fig. 7. The attacker’s success probability to replace/impersonate tags.
TABLE 1
Comparison of RFID Group Authentication Protocols.
Protocols Time Cost Communication Cost Tag Privacy
Grouping Proof [7], [9] n× (tc + tr) n× (c+ r)
√
Tree-based [31], [32] 2.66n× (tc + tr) O(n logn)× (c+ r) ×
Aloha-based [30], [32] 1.22n× (tc + s× tr) O(n)× (c+ r) ×
BSTSA [32] 1.25n× (tc + 4.4s× tr) O(n)× (c+ r) ×
Chen et al. [12] O(n)× (tc + tr) O(n)× (c+ r)
√
Dhailah et al. [22] n× (tc + tr) n× (c+ r) ×
Ours tc + tr c+ r
√
n is the number of tags in a group.
tc, tr are the time cost of sending a challenge/query and a response.
s is the length of the frame used in Aloha based protocol, namely,
the number of time slots in a frame.
c, r are the length of a challenge and a response respectively.
which reduces the communication cost to c+ r. This makes
our protocol much more efficient than existing protocols not
only in time cost but also in communication cost.
In addition, we made experiments on the UMich MOO
design [47], which is based on Intel’s Wireless Identification
and Sensing Platform (WISP) UHF tags. Specifically, the
MOO is a passive UHF device that is composed of an
MSP430 micro-controller unit (MCU), an ultra-low power
MCU with a 16-bit instruction set, which operates from a 2-
volt supply with an internal clock of 1.075 MHz. We realize
the function f with a 128-bit-key Advanced Encryption S-
tandard (AES) encryption algorithm, while the RFID tag has
an identity with length of 96 bits. The tested running time
of an encryption is about 12ms and it takes the tag about
40ms and 60ms to run the basic and extended protocols,
respectively, which is very efficient.
6 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of practical aspects that should be taken
into account when implementing the proposed scheme,
which in turn affect possible application scenarios. These
aspects include the system architecture, the size of the group
that is to be authenticated and the RFID technology used.
RFID is used in a variety of systems, which have d-
ifferent operational objectives. Even if only inventory or
supply chain management systems are considered there are
still a number of divergent system architectures. In some
systems the items are tracked in a large area and maximum
operating range is a key objective. In such cases multiple
readers are often used to increase reliability in detecting
all the tokens within the system’s coverage, i.e. multiple
readers cover the same area and one reader might detect
a token that another has missed. As mentioned in Section 4,
the scheme proposed in this paper is intended to operate in
a system where a single reader communicates with a group,
because the reader has to receive the replies from all the
tokens to identify the bit collisions. The proposed scheme
will therefore not be practical in a system where one token
in a group is read by one reader and another token is read
by another reader. However, not all inventory management
systems use such an architecture. Some systems instead
require to identify items that are located within a small area.
For example, a bunch of tagged items move on a conveyor
belt. This architecture is also more likely to be used in
applications that identify items within a specific container
or package, i.e. in systems where items are grouped and
could benefit from the proposed scheme. In such systems,
token data is aggregated by a single reader, which means
that bit collisions could be reliably identified.
In Section 4.1.1 the length of the authentication state
is stated to be 2cn, with c being the number of collisions
contributed by each tag and n being the number of tags in
the group. In practice, the length of the token’s authentica-
tion state is restricted by the tag’s storage and computation
capability. The number of tokens making up a group, with
the collisions per token determined by a chosen target attack
probability, is therefore limited. In addition, the number of
tokens that could be read at the same time by a single reader
is constrained by some practical issues, e.g., the receiver
architecture of the reader and the reader’s communication
range.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is more practical in a
system that needs to authenticate a large number of groups
containing a limited number of tags, in which case it could
increase throughput without placing additional burden on
the reader or token technology, or achieve the same through-
put with simpler and therefore less expensive equipment.
For example, a pharmaceutical system could be monitor-
ing containers containing individually tagged blister packs.
Under normal circumstances a system that deals with 120
containers per minute (each container contains 15 blister
12
packs) needs to finish 1800 authentication operations within
one minute, which means the reader and each tag has to run
the authentication procedure in approximately 33 ms. As a
comparison, our proposed protocol only requires the system
to run 120 authentication operations per minute, which
gives the reader and each tag 500 ms to finish the authentica-
tion procedure. Alternatively, the system throughput could
be increased to monitor 1800 containers every minute using
the same reader and tokens as before. This simple example
illustrates that a group does not necessarily have to contain
a large number of tags to achieve practical benefits from the
proposed scheme.
A number of RFID technologies use the general principle
of communication collisions to check if multiple tokens are
present during the token selection process. However, as
explained in Section 2 the back-channel coding (Manchester)
defined in the ISO 14443 and ISO 15693 HF RFID standards
can be used without modification to implement our scheme,
as any bit period can be distinctly classified as a ‘1’, a ‘0’, or
a collision. Although UHF technology is often associated
with inventory management there are also numerous such
systems utilising HF technology. ISO 15693 tokens are often
used for this application, e.g. NXP I-Code and TI Tag-It
tokens, and such an ISO 15693 system could achieve an
operating range up to 1 m which is comparable to ‘near-
field’ UHF tokens used for item-level tagging in controlled
read zone applications. It is therefore feasible that the pro-
posed scheme could be deployed in inventory management
systems using existing technology.
The proposed scheme depends on the tokens’ capabil-
ity to generate deterministic bit collisions, by transmitting
the calculated token authentication states as described in
Section 4.1.1, and the reader’s capability to reliably detect
such collisions. To test these aspects we implemented a
proof-of-concept system using a HF token testbed (ISO
14443/15693) we constructed, shown in Figure 8, and an
off-the-shelf multi-ISO HF RFID reader build around a NXP
CL RC632 contactless reader IC. The reader IC implements
a correlation receiver, basically integrating over half the bit
period and comparing the output to a fixed threshold, and
could be configured to output intermediate signals within
the demodulation/decoding process. We could therefore
monitor the output after the correlation step to see if a
collision was detected, i.e. if there are sufficient peaks in
both halves of the bit period.
Figure 9 shows some example output traces from the
reader IC. The HF token testbed implements the physical
communication layers as specified in the related standard,
does clock recovery based on the reader’s carrier and con-
tains a 8-bit micro-controller to implement additional func-
tions. It was relatively simple to synchronise multiple token-
s’ responses to a common ‘bit grid’ using a data clock signal
derived from the reader’s carrier and a period counter. The
counter was started at the end of a transmission from the
reader. This is to be expected taken that this level of syn-
chronisation is already used in current RFID systems, e.g.
ISO 14443, for anti-collision. Multiple testbed ‘tokens’ could
therefore be made to participate in the protocol and these
were able to construct a verifiable group authentication state
by synchronously replying with their authentication state.
We also experimented with groups of different sizes
Fig. 8. Constructed HF token emulator
Fig. 9. Intermediate receiver output after correlation step showing a bit
collision: 1) bit sequence 1, 2) bit sequence 2, 3) bit sequence 1+2, and
4) the combined bit sequence 1+2 as modulated onto the HF carrier
consisting of x off-the-shelf tokens transmitting the same
sequence and 1 off-the-shelf token causing a single bit error.
The reader we used allowed for a maximum group size of
11 (10+1), after which the collision was no longer reliably
detected. Beyond this threshold the decreased carrier ampli-
tude, resulting from the number of tokens drawing power
from the reader and thereby acting as a load on the carrier,
effected the operation of the receiver in such a way that the
collision was no longer detected. A more powerful reader,
with a different receiver architecture might allow for a larger
group, although a group of size 11 could still be useful
and fits within the practical application scenarios described
earlier in this section.
7 CONCLUSION
In this article a group authentication protocol for RFID-
based secure tracking systems is presented. Specially, the
proposed protocol enables a verifier to authenticate a group
of tags simultaneously based on controlled bit-collision pat-
terns. All the tags can send their individual responses at the
same time which results in a composite group response. As a
consequence, the verifier can therefore authenticate a group
of tags within a limited time period that is comparable
to the time taken to perform a single challenge-response
authentication. With this advantage, the transaction time to
deal with a group of tagged items by a reader is significantly
decreased, and thus is quite suitable for practical RFID-
based tracking systems in which the available transaction
time is constrained due to high tag throughput. The present-
ed protocol employs only some pseudorandom functions
and bit operations, so that the computation complexity
especially in the tag side is very low which is comparable
to the cryptographic primitives required by most grouping
proofs and lightweight authentication protocols proposed
for the RFID environment. We then give a thorough security
analysis of the proposed protocol, where in particular we
investigated the attack success probability under five promi-
nent attack scenarios and demonstrated that it is possible
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to obtain a low attack probability when appropriate n and
c are chosen. In addition, we extend the basic protocol to
preserve the privacy for tags. Future work could investigate
the possibility of new or existing UHF PHY/MAC layers
supporting this scheme, as well as the design of a custom
reader to possibly allow for more tokens to be part of the
group.
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